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We investigate the theory that the left inferior parietal lobe (IPL) is closely associated with
tracking potential differences of perspective. Developmental studies find that perspective
tasks are mastered at around 4 years of age. Our first study, meta-analyses of brain
imaging studies shows that perspective tasks specifically activate a region in the left
IPL and precuneus. These tasks include processing of false belief, visual perspective,
and episodic memory. We test the location specificity theory in our second study
with an unusual and novel kind of perspective task: identity statements. According to
Frege’s classical logical analysis, identity statements require appreciation of modes of
presentation (perspectives). We show that identity statements, e.g., “the tour guide is
also the driver” activate the left IPL in contrast to a control statements, “the tour guide has
an apprentice.” This activation overlaps with the activations found in the meta-analysis.
This finding is confirmed in a third study with different types of statements and different
comparisons. All studies support the theory that the left IPL has as one of its overarching
functions the tracking of perspective differences. We discuss how this function relates to
the bottom-up attention function proposed for the bilateral IPL.
Keywords: identity, false belief, episodic memory, visual perspective taking, fMRI, IPL, overarching function
Introduction
There is growing evidence that the dorsal part of the left temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), which
overlaps with the left inferior parietal lobe (IPL), is reliably activated by perspective tasks (Goel
et al., 1995; Ruby and Decety, 2003). Perspective tasks are tasks that require tracking of (potential
or actual) perspective differences1. Findings from cognitive development indicate that these tasks
share a common cognitive basis. They are mastered around the age of 4 years. Brain imaging
1With “tracking perspective differences” or, for short, “perspective tracking” we want to merely grasp the existence of this
concept required for registering an actual or potential conflict between perspectives. The more common term “perspective
taking” suggests the ability to put oneself into another perspective than the perspective one currently has. This would require
the tracking of a particular perspective not just the tracking of a potential perspective difference. For, one can be aware of
perspectives being involved without being able to switch between them. One can be aware that another person has or may
have a different perspective without actually being able to figure out what that perspective is.
Abbreviations: +IDENT, identity condition; −IDENT, control of identity condition; +REVISION, belief revision
condition; −REVISION, control of belief revision condition; IDENTc, identity-with-context; PREDc, predication-with-
context; C, context-only; IDENTo, identity only; BL, baseline condition; FB, false belief; vPT, visual perspective taking; EM,
episodic memory.
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studies of perspective tasks also point to a common neural basis.
Existing evidence suggests regional specificity (Kanwisher, 2010)
of different kinds of perspective tasks activating the left IPL2 .
Our aim is to test this specificity hypothesis in three steps. In the
first step we carry out a meta-analysis of existing data from three
different kinds of perspective tasks to test the regional specificity
hypothesis. Partial activation overlap of the different kinds of
tasks within left IPL counts in favor of the hypothesis. In the
second step we test the hypothesis further with the prediction
that a novel and unusual perspective task, processing identity
statements, should activate within the region identified by the
meta-analysis. In a third step we confirm this finding with novel
stimulus material. To carry through with this project we need to
be more specific about what perspective tasks are and about the
criteria that define the region of overlap, for which we adopt the
overarching view proposed by Cabeza et al. (2012).
What are Perspective Tasks?
In response to this question we follow the intuition elaborated
by Perner et al. (2003), who links the notion of perspective
to the notion of representation and modes of presentation. A
representation represents something (object, target) as being in
a certain way (content). The content provides a perspective of the
target. Hence, if two representations represent the same target
(e.g., the spatial relation between objects A and B) but differ in
their content, i.e., how they represent the target as being (“A is
in front of B” vs. “A is behind B”) then we face a perspective
difference. Similarly, if one person individualizes an entity as a
mouse, another person the same entity as an animal, they differ in
how they think of the same target object. Psycholinguists express
this point by saying that the choice of label for an object puts a
different perspective on that object (see Clark, 1997; Tomasello,
1999). In general, a perspective task can be characterized as a
task where one becomes aware of the distinction between the
target and content. We now need to show that this can cover the
different cases in which all visual perspective tasks are thought to
play a role.
Visual Perspective
If two people look at different scenes their visual representations
are likely to differ because they see different scenes and not
because they have different visual perspectives of the same scene.
In contrast, if they stand side by side looking at the same
scene they see the same things in the world but their visual
representations still differ. Since they are looking at the same
scene that difference cannot be attributed to a difference in the
scenes they are looking at (the target) but only to how that single
scene presents itself differently to them due to their different
viewing positions. In the developmental literature children’s
understanding of perspective in this sense has been captured by
the notion of Level 2 perspective taking (Masangkay et al., 1974;
Flavell et al., 1981). At around 4 years of age children become
able to understand that people who look at the same objects
2With IPL we denote the inferior parietal lobe consisting of the ventral region
comprised by BA 40 located in the supramarginal gyrus and BA 39 located in the
angular gyrus (Caspers et al., 2006, 2008).
may see them related in different ways due to their different
viewing position. The classic example is a simple drawing of
a turtle positioned on a table between experimenter and child,
who face each other across the table. Children before the age of
4 years understand that the turtle “stands on its feet” when its
feet are pointing toward the child, and that it is “lying on its
back” when the drawing has been turned by 180◦. However, when
asked whether the experimenter sees the turtle as standing on its
feet or lying on its back they cannot give a correct answer until
around 4 years of age. In contrast, much younger children have
no problems with Level 1 perspective taking tasks, which test the
understanding that people may see different things from different
vantage points. For instance, if on a piece of paper, e.g., a car is
drawn on one side and a lion on the other side, children correctly
point out that the experimenter can see the car when they can see
the lion.
Unfortunately, brain imaging studies do not systematically
observe this distinction between Levels 1 and 2 tasks. Most
of them contrast questions about what another person can see
with what the participants themselves can see. Although this
often only requires a Level 1 understanding, it is still likely that
instruction to pay attention to what others see naturally triggers
Level 2 perspective taking processes.
False Belief
The false belief test (Wimmer and Perner, 1983) has become the
most popular way of assessing understanding and processing of
other people’s mental states both in developmental (Wellman
et al., 2001) and brain imaging research (Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003). Brain imaging studies present short vignettes in which
people develop a false belief (e.g., Aichhorn et al., 2009): “Julia
sees the ice cream van go to the lake. She doesn’t see that the
van turns off to the town hall. Therefore, Julia will look for the
ice cream van at the. . . lake/town hall?” To understand that Julia
is mistaken about the location of the ice cream van one has to
understand that she represents the van as being at the lake, while
we know that it is at the town hall. Both, Julia and we represent
the current location of the van (target) but she represents it as
being at the lake while we represent it as being at the town hall.
This is a difference in content hence a difference in perspective.
In contrast most imaging studies use the so-called “false
photo” task3 (originally designed for children; Zaitchik, 1990),
e.g., “Julia takes a picture of the ice cream van in front of
the pond. The ice cream van moves to the market place; the
picture gets developed. In the picture the ice cream van is by
the. . . pond/market place?” (Aichhorn et al., 2009). Although
this task parallels in many ways the belief task—an object changes
location and a representation of the object in its original location
(photo/belief) persists—there are crucial differences. Unlike the
belief the photo is not false and, unlike the belief, one does not
have to understand the photo as giving a differing perspective
on the object’s location from its actual location. One just has to
describe where the object is in the photo (notice: one could not
ask “In Julia’s belief the ice cream van is . . . ?”).
3The common name for this task is an unfortunate misnomer because the photo
correctly represents the object’s earlier location (Perner and Leekam, 2008).
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Episodic Memory
Episodic memory is defined in Tulving’s tradition by Wheeler
et al. (1997) as re-experiences of earlier experiences. Re-
experience requires tracking of perspective. When simply
experiencing an event one just takes in the event without
reflecting on the fact that one has had an experience. In contrast,
when re-experiencing a past event one has to understand that the
experience one currently has provides but a view (perspective)
of an actual past event. Without this awareness one would either
mistake the re-experience for an actual experience resulting in
severe delusion, or one would mistake it for an experience of
an imagined, fictional event. In neither case would it count as
remembering the past.
The strictest way to test for episodic memory is the remember-
know judgment (Tulving, 1989). When able to retrieve a learned
item or able to recognize it, participants are asked to judge
whether they really remember the item, i.e., can relive their
experience, or whether they just know that the item had been
presented. Unlike knowing of an event the critical element of
remembering an event is the double awareness of re-experiencing
the event and of the fact that the event happened in one’s past. In
order not to mistake the re-experience as experiencing the same
event again (Martin, 2001) one has to understand the ongoing
re-experience as providing a perspective on something that has
happened in the past.
False Signs
This task has been developed for children (Parkin, 1994) and was
adopted for brain imaging by Aichhorn et al. (2009), e.g., The ice
cream vendor’s sign points to the lake. The ice cream van goes to
the town hall without changing the sign. According to the sign
post the ice cream van is at the. . . lake/town hall?” The false
sign vignettes share with the false belief vignettes misinformation
or misconception about the current state of things. In the belief
vignette Julia thinks the van is at the lake, and in the false sign
vignette the sign shows that the van is at the lake, when it really
is at the town hall. Both vignettes differ from the “false photo”
vignettes in this respect. The photo does not show where the ice
cream van is, and participants are asked where in Julia’s photo
the van is. As pointed out earlier, this question is not possible
for Julia’s belief (Where in Julia’s mind is the ice cream van?)
and it is not possible for the false sign (Where in the sign is the
ice cream van?). The two imaging studies that used false sign
vignettes tested whether these vignettes activated the same brain
regions as false beliefs in contrast to the “false photo” vignettes.
Commonality of Perspective Tasks
Developmental Synchrony
The four kinds of perspective tasks listed above are those for
which we could find brain imaging data. All of them have been
used in child appropriate versions in developmental studies.
They all tend to be mastered between the age of 3–5 years (e.g.,
episodic remembering: Perner and Ruffman, 1995; Naito, 2003).
Moreover, several studies have used the false belief task together
with other perspective tasks and consistently found correlations
between these tasks when controlling for differences in age and
verbal intelligence (for overview see Perner and Roessler, 2012).
In particular, passing the false belief task correlates with passing
the level 2 visual perspective task (Hamilton et al., 2009—also in
children with autism) and with passing the false sign task (Parkin,
1994; Bowler et al., 2008—also in children with autism; Sabbagh
et al., 2006; Leekam et al., 2008; Iao and Leekam, 2014). Another
perspective task used with children, which has not been used for
brain imaging, is the appearance reality task (Flavell et al., 1983),
in which children are explicitly asked what a deceptive object (a
piece of sponge that looks like a rock) looks like and what it really
is. Children’s ability to draw this distinction also correlates with
passing the false belief task (Gopnik and Astington, 1988; Taylor
and Carlson, 1997; Courtin and Melot, 2005).
Cerebral Overlap: The Overarching View
Many of the developmental perspective tasks have been used in
brain imaging experiments on adults. We now look for evidence
whether their common development is also reflected in shared
brain activity. A strict criterion for sharing brain activation would
be activation overlap of all perspective tasks. This may, however,
be an overly conservative criterion as Cabeza et al. (2012) argued
for a similar case. Instead of looking for complete overlap
they proposed the “overarching function” view that allows for
subdivisions within a broader brain region. The broad region (in
our case, the left IPL) has a global, overarching function (tracking
perspective) and its various sub-regions mediate different aspects
(false beliefs, visual perspectives, etc.) of the global function. The
expected pattern of finding is that each perspective task should
activate the broad region and partially overlap with activations by
other perspective tasks. To check whether existing data support
this view we extended an existing meta-analysis for false belief
studies and visual perspective taking by Schurz et al. (2013) by
also including episodic memory studies testing for remember-
know judgments.
Study 1: Meta-analysis
For false belief studies and visual perspective studies we used the
meta-analysis data from the work by Schurz et al. (2013) based on
25 false belief and 14 visual perspective taking (vPT)4 studies. To
this we added a meta-analysis of episodic memory (EM) studies
that contrast items judged as “remembered” or “recollected” (the
sense of being able to re-experience the learning phase) with
items judged as just “known” or “of high confidence familiarity”
(the sense of the item being old without a re-experience of
learning the item). We found 16 studies that make the relevant
contrasts (see details in Table S1 in supplementary material).
4In order to find enough studies to allow for a meta-analysis, Schurz et al. (2013)
included level 1 as well as level 2 perspective tasks. Although this is conceptually
less than optimal, a follow-up review by the authors showed that the main areas for
vPT (e.g., the left IPL and precuneus) were equally often reported in Level 1 and
in Level 2 tasks (see Table 3 on p.7 in Schurz et al., 2013). Although level 1 tasks
are easy for children because they can be solved without understanding different
views of the same target (simply by judging whether the object is within or outside
the other person’s field of vision), the same activations by level 1 and level 2 tasks
in the meta-analysis suggest that level 1 tasks trigger level 2 perspective thoughts
in adults. The level 1 question of what the other sees tends also to activate concerns
about how the other sees the object, a level 2 concern.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 360
Arora et al. Identity and awareness of perspective
All meta-analytic maps were thresholded at a voxel-wise
threshold of p < 0.005 uncorrected and a cluster extent threshold
at 10 voxels. Figure 1 shows the activation maps for each meta-
analysis. As one can see there is a potential overlap among
all three kinds of tasks only on the left lateral hemisphere
(2nd and 4th column) in the parietal lobe and medially (3rd
column) in the posterior parts around the precuneus. Figure 2
shows these two areas in detail. Overlap in Figure 2 was
determined by conjunction analysis between maps of significant
meta-analytic activation (i.e., conjunction determined areas
significantly activated in map1 AND map 2). This was done with
the image calculator in SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/).
The observed pattern of overlap among activations from the
three meta-analyses conforms to the view by Cabeza et al. (2012)
that the IPL and possibly also parts of the anterior (y close
to −60) precuneus have the overarching function of tracking
perspective: All three kinds of tasks overlap in a central area
but also activate individually surrounding areas. We can now
use the activations shown in the meta-analyses to check whether
other perspective tasks, which were tested only in a few studies,
overlap with the meta-analysis. Since activations in individual
studies tend to be variable we cannot expect each single study
to show overlap with the central area where the three meta-
analytic activations overlap. Hence our criterion for supporting
evidence is that the activation of perspective tasks from individual
studiesmust overlap with at least one of the activation areas of the
meta-analysis.
As a first test case we have two studies that used false sign
vignettes (Perner et al., 2006; Aichhorn et al., 2009). They looked
at the regions of interest defined by the false belief vs. photo
vignettes (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003). In both studies the false
sign vignettes activated the right IPL less than the false belief with
no difference to the photo vignettes. In the left IPL the vignettes
activated more strongly than the photo with no difference to the
false belief. The same held true for the precuneus as expected
under the regional specificity hypothesis that perspective tasks
like the false sign task should overlap with other perspective tasks
in the left IPL and precuneus.
Moreover, the left IPL was also reported in studies using
conceptual perspective tasks (Goel et al., 1995; Ruby and Decety,
2003). Goel et al. (1995) asked participants to describe how,
e.g., a person like Columbus from the perspective of the 15th
century could infer the function of a modern artifact, e.g., hair
drier. They reported activation in the left IPL and precuneus.
Ruby and Decety (2003) asked medical students to respond to
health-related questions either from their own perspective or
from the perspective of a “lay person.” Third person vs. first
person activated the IPL/TPJ on the left and also on the right
(to be expected since the third person perspective relied heavily
on what the lay person believes about the issues). No precuneus
activation was reported. So these studies confirm that the left IPL
and (with less certainty) precuneus have the overarching function
of tracking perspective.
In the following we test the prediction. We argue that
processing identity statements requires the tracking of
perspectives and thus should activate these areas in the left
IPL and in precuneus whose overarching function is to track
perspective.
FIGURE 1 | Activation maps of meta-analyses for three different domains. All maps are thresholded at voxel-wise threshold of p < 0.005 uncorrected and a
cluster extent threshold of 10 voxels. Activations of all meta-analyses are superimposed on the Talairach template.
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FIGURE 2 | Conjunction map of all meta-analyses false belief (FB),
episodic memory (EM), and visual perspective taking (vPT). White
indicates the regions activated by one meta-analysis, red and yellow indicate
the conjunction of at least two and three meta-analyses. Location of
activation peaks for the identity contrast are shown as blue circles with the
number of the study—see Table 4 for peak coordinates and overlap details
(areas of the blue circles do not reflect the actual size of the activation). All
meta-analytic maps were thresholded at voxel-wise threshold of p < 0.005
uncorrected and a cluster extent threshold of 10 voxels. Activations of all
meta-analyses are superimposed on the Talairach template.
Study 2: Identity 1
We want to provide a new test of the regional specificity
hypothesis that the left IPL and possibly the anterior precuneus
have the overarching function of tracking perspectives. For this
test we try to identify an unusual candidate for a perspective
task and then investigate whether it, too, activates the predicted
areas. For our test we focus on identity statements, which on
first blush seem to have little affinity to perspective. However,
identity statements, e.g., “the driver is the tour guide” involve
different labels (“driver,” “tour guide”) for the same individual.
Psycholinguists often say that identifying an object under
different labels puts a different perspective on that object (see
Clark, 1997; Tomasello, 1999). Frege’s (1967) and May’s (2001)
famous analysis of identity statements brings out the importance
of perspective in the form of modes of presentation. In the
identity statement “the driver is the tour guide” the expressions
“the driver” and “the tour guide” refer to the same individual
(person X). If the meaning of these expressions were understood
only in terms of their referent (person X) then the identity
statement would not be informative, for it would reduce to
“person X is person X.” The statement only makes sense if one
is sensitive to the fact that each constituent expression provides
a different mode of presentation (sense or perspective) of that
particular individual to which they both refer.
Mental files (Perry, 2002; Recanati, 2012) provide a helpful
alternative approach for seeing how perspective enters identity
statements and why they have an affinity to understanding belief
(Perner and Leahy, 2015). Use of the referential expressions “the
driver” and “the tour guide” in discourse create two mental
files for the same referent. They capture the two ways how one
conceives of person X. The files contain the information that
one has accumulated for the person under each conception.
The identity statement makes clear that these are but different
conceptions of a single person. One can then either keep the
two files separate but link them (Perry, 2002) or merge them
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into a single file for person X5. Similarly when representing what
someone mistakenly thinks, e.g., Julia in the false belief vignettes
about the ice cream van, two mental files are created, a regular
file registering what one knows about the van, and a vicarious
file indexed to Julia. The vicarious file is linked to the regular file
(Recanati, 2012) to represent sameness of referent, and on the
file one registers what Julia thinks about the van. In other words,
the regular file captures how oneself conceives of the van and
the vicarious file how Julia conceives of it. Both, understanding
identity statements and attributing false beliefs, require linked
files for a single referent. This common requirement can explain
why understanding identity and belief emerges at the same age
(Perner et al., 2011; Perner and Leahy, 2015).
If one wants to assess brain activation due to identity
statements, one has to make sure that the stimulus material
induces the relevant processing. There is a danger that listeners
to a statement like, “the driver is the tour guide,” do not—as
intended—think of two individuals, the driver and the tour guide,
and then understand that there is but a single individual who
is the driver and the tour guide. Instead, especially under the
repetitive presentation conditions typical for fMRI, participants
may gloss the sentence as “the driver is a tour guide,” i.e., they
only ever think of one individual as driver and then encode that
he works as a tour guide. This would ruin our identity condition.
Therefore, we took care that participants naturally thought
of two different individuals before they were given the critical
identity information, e.g.:
S1: “On this bus trip the tour guide talks to the passengers as much
as the driver.”
The listener now thinks of two people, the tour guide and the
driver. Then the identity statement is given:
S2: (+IDENT): “The tour guide is also the driver.”
This informs the listener that there are not two people involved
but only one person. This should—according to our Fregean
analysis—make the listener aware that “tour guide” and “driver”
are just two different perspectives (modes of presentation,
conceptions) of that one person. A suitable control statement
needs to be syntactically and in other aspects as similar as possible
to our critical statement without involving an identity relation,
e.g.:
S2: (−IDENT): “The tour guide has an assistant6.”
5Anderson and Hastie (1974) showed in a reaction time experiment that people
who have learned seemingly about two people and then learn that they are the
same person keep the representation (files) for each person separate at first and
later tend to merge them into a single file.
6Ideally the control sentence should be improved in two ways. One improvement
would be to use the same names as in the identity statements: “The tour guide
also has a driver,” but that would clash with the first sentence. However, this
difference in name is expected to be controlled for by the use of many different
sentences using different names for the identity and the control. However, it
leaves a systematic difference; the two names mentioned in S1 are both mentioned
again in S2 in +IDENT but only one of them in −IDENT. We therefore verified
whether repetition of namesmight activate the left IPL and precuneus in our study.
Unfortunately, in addition to the minor linguistic differences,
there is another not so negligible difference between these two
versions of sentence S2 to contend with. When two different
referential expressions like “the tour guide” and “the driver”
are used we naturally think (build a mental model) of two
distinct people. Although natural, it is strictly speaking a rash
interpretation, as the ensuing identity information makes clear.
There are not two but only one person talked about. In other
words, the listener has to revise her rashly formed belief of two
distinct people on this bus trip to believing that there is only
one person filling both positions. Quite plausibly the listener
will also notice that she has been briefly misled, which amounts
to attributing a false belief to herself in the immediate past. So
we need to control for this in order to prevent misinterpreting
activations due to the listener attributing a false belief to herself
as activations caused by identity statements. In order to control
for this possibility we introduced two further variations of
sentence S2 one involving belief revision without any identity
information:
S2: (+REVISION): “Today, the tour guide talks more than the
driver.”
This would also lead to revision of the belief created by the
first sentence that both people always talk the same amount.
In contrast to S2 (+IDENT) it does not involve an identity
statement. In order to identify activations due to this belief
revision we also used a control that was syntactically similar to
S2 (+REVISION) without involving a belief revision. It just adds
more information:
S2: (−REVISION): “The tour guide also earns as much as the
driver.”
The objective of our study is to see whether the identity contrast
(+IDENT > −IDENT contrast) activates identifiable regions of
the brain. The most general question (1) is whether there is any
such region. More specifically (2) we expect activations in areas
relevant for perspective awareness, specifically the network in
the left IPL identified in Figures 1, 2 by meta-analyses of other
perspective tasks.
However, these expectations have to be modulated
by results of our belief revision control contrast
(+REVISION > −REVISION), which indicates that belief
revision leads to self-attribution of a false belief. In this case the
identity contrast (+IDENT > −IDENT) can only be interpreted
outside these regions unless the (+IDENT > +REVISION)
contrast is also significant, i.e., the identity statement activates
Almor et al. (2007) contrasted a condition where the name introduced in the first
sentence was repeated in the second sentence with a condition where a pronoun
was used in the second sentence instead. This contrast did not show any activation
in the IPL. There was activation in the precuneus, but in quite a different part than
the activations in the present study. Another improvement would be to use “is”
instead of “has,” e.g., “the tour guide is a driver,” but this creates the danger that
participants might gloss this statement as an identity statement and annihilate any
activation difference between identity and control condition.
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the region in addition to any false belief attribution caused by
belief revision7.
Method
Participants
Twenty-one university students (6 males, mean age 23.95 years,
SD = 3.96) participated in this study for course credits and small
monetary reimbursement. All participants were native German
speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and had
no history of neurological disorder. A written informed consent
was obtained from all the participants before scanning. The
ethics committee of the University of Salzburg approved the
study.
Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of written German sentences (example
sentences translated in English are presented in Table 1). During
the whole experiment, 18 different scenarios were used to
administer the four conditions of interest (+IDENT, −IDENT,
+REVISION, –REVISION). For a particular scenario there was a
standard first sentence S1. The second sentence (S2) differed for
each of the four conditions. This yielded 72 different vignettes.
The whole scanning session was split into three runs consisting
of six trials of each condition. To avoid sequence effects vignettes
derived from the same scenario were never presented near
each other. Moreover, participants were instructed that all
vignettes could be treated as independent and nothing had to
be remembered for longer than one trial. Thirty percent of
the vignettes were followed by a control question. Whether
the question was about the first or the second sentence, the
side of “Yes” and “No” response, and the side of the correct
answer-key was randomized. Stimulus presentation, timings and
response recording were controlled by Presentation software
(Neurobehavioral System, Albany, CA, USA).
Procedure and Design
Participants were asked to read short vignettes. Every trial
consisted of at least two sentences. At the beginning only the
first sentence S1 (e.g., “On the bus trip the tour guide talks as
much as the driver”) was presented for 5 s. Then the second
sentence S2 (e.g., “The tour guide is the driver”) was added and
both sentences remained for a further 6 s on the screen. In 70%
of the trials of each scanning run the vignette was followed by
the word “CONTINUE” (500ms) to indicate that the trial had
finished and the next one was about to start. To ensure the
compliance of participants, they had to answer in the remaining
trials a simple question within 6 s (e.g., “Thus a driver is on the
trip: Yes?/No?) by pressing a key. Between trials a fixation cross
was presented with varying duration, ranging from one to 4 s.
7As one of our reviewers rightly pointed out the contradiction in the control
task (+REVISION) is a direct incompatibility between S1 and S2, while the
contradiction in the identity task only occurs due to natural pragmatic assumptions
about S1 of there being two separate individuals. On this basis one would expect
stronger activations for belief revision in the control than in the identity task. This
safeguards against false positives, i.e., that we would not detect the effects of belief
revision in the control task when it is present in the identity task.
Correct affirmative and negative answers were balanced within
conditions.
The no-question trials lasted for an average of 14 s and
question trials for an average of 19.5 s. Before the start of each
trial there was an inter-stimulus interval of 1–4 s. The sequence
of the trial and the inter-stimulus interval was optimized using
Russ Poldrack’s script (we optimized a fixed time span for four
conditions of interest and one rest condition; http://sourceforge.
net/projects/fmri-toolbox/files/optimize_design/1.1/).
fMRI Data Acquisition
Functional and structural imaging was acquired with a Siemens
3 Tesla Tim-Trio Scanner, located at Christian-Doppler-Clinic,
Salzburg. Functional images sensitive to the BOLD contrast
were obtained with a T2*-weighted gradient echo-planar imaging
(EPI) sequence using a 32 channel head coil. Per subject, three
sessions, and a total of 239 EPI images including 6 dummy
scans at the beginning of the functional images were scanned
to allow transient signals to diminish (TR = 2000ms; TE =
30ms; matrix size = 96 × 96; voxel size = 2.187 × 2.187 ×
3.58mm3; slice thickness = 3.0mm; slice gap 0.6mm; FOV =
210mm; flip angle = 70◦). Thirty-six axial slices were acquired
in descending order parallel to the bicommissural (co-planar
with AC–PC) line along the z-axis. In addition to functional
scanning, sagittally oriented high-resolution structural scan was
acquired (T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence; TR = 6.73ms;
TE = 3.14ms; voxel size 0.797 × 0.797 × 1.2mm3; slice-
thickness= 1.2mm;matrix 256×256; FOV= 204mm; 170 slices
per volume; flip angle= 8◦).
fMRI Data Processing
Preprocessing and statistical data analysis was performed by
Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM8, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.
uk/spm), implemented in MATLAB 7.3 [R2006b] (Matworks,
Sherborn, MA) runtime environment. Images were slice-time
and motion corrected by standard SPM8 algorithms. Functional
images were registered to the SPM8 EPI template. The structural
scan was co-registered onto the mean functional images of each
session and segmented. Segmentation parameters were used for
normalization of structural and functional images to MNI space
(Montreal Neurological Institute, McGill, Montreal, Canada)
template. The normalized images were resampled to isotropic
3 × 3 × 3mm voxels and smoothed with an 8mm full width at
half maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel.
The preprocessed data were analyzed using a general linear
model (GLM) approach. The functional data were high-pass
filtered in order to remove frequencies below 1/128Hz to reduce
low frequency drift. The serial correlation was taken into account
using the autocorrelation AR (1) model, as implemented in
SPM8. On individual level contrast the four conditions relative to
fixation baseline were modeled. The condition sentence (S2) was
modeled as an event of interest for all four conditions separately.
The context sentence (S1) and the verification questions were
modeled as regressors of no interest. Additionally, realignment
parameters and session mean were included as covariates. The
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TABLE 1 | Example sentences of Study 2 (translated from German; see Table S2. in supplementary material for more original examples in German).
Conditions Context sentence (S1) 5 s Condition sentence (S2) 6 s Verification sentence 6 s
Identity (+IDENT) On this bus trip the tour guide
talks to the passengers as
much as the drivera
The tour guide is also the driver Thus, a tour guide is on the bus. <yes>
No Identity (−IDENT) The tour guide has an assistant Thus, the assistant always comes
along. <yes>
Belief Revision (+REVISION) Today, the tour guide talks more than the driver Thus, today one of them does more of
the talking. <yes>
No Belief Revision (−REVISION) The tour guide also earns as much as the driver Thus, both earn different amounts of
money. <no>
aThe same context sentence was used for all conditions.
TABLE 2 | Behavioral results of Study 2: mean accuracy in percent hit rate
(SD).
Conditions
+IDENT −IDENT +REVISION −REVISION
Hit-Rate (%)SD 91.3(14.3) 87.2(8.5) 90.3(12.4) 94.3(9.1)
first level contrast images of each subject were used for the second
level (random effects) analysis, that allows for the generalization
to the population. The statistical comparisons were inspected at
a voxelwise threshold of p < 0.001 together with a cluster extent
threshold of p < 0.05, corrected for family-wise error (FWE).
Results
Behavioral Results
The overall accuracy was around 90% (see Table 2), indicating
that the participants were attentive and understood the task.
We computed a One-Way repeated measure ANOVA using
participants’ hit-rates. There was no statistically significant
difference in accuracy across the four conditions [F(3, 60) =
1.488, p = 0.22, η2 = 0.069]. This implies that the difficulty
level was similar across all conditions.
We will not report reaction times (RT) for the sake of brevity.
This is because RTs were collected on the Yes/No responses to
the questions presented within the response window of 6 s, they
do not reflect the actual time taken to comprehend the vignettes
but rather the time taken to read the question and respond “yes”
or “no” to the visual cue.
Neuro-imaging Results
We report all regions for identity and belief revision contrasts at
FWE cluster level corrected p < 0.05 in Table 3.
Of main interest was the identity contrast comparing identity
with its control condition (+IDENT > −IDENT). Only one
parietal activation in the left inferior parietal lobe (left IPL) with
its main peak and one of the sub-peaks in the supramarginal
gyrus (SMG) and another sub-peak in angular gyrus (AG) was
FWE cluster level corrected significant at p < 0.05. Comparison
in the opposite direction (−IDENT > +IDENT) did not reveal
any significant cluster.
TABLE 3 | Supra-threshold whole brain activation of identity and belief
revision in Study 2.
Region H k Max Z MNI coordinates
x y z
IDENTITY: +IDENT > −IDENT
Supramarginal Gyrus (PF L) L 90 4.46 −60 −34 37
Angular Gyrus (PFm L) L – 3.84 −54 −52 43
Supramarginal Gyrus (PF L) L – 3.55 −54 −43 46
BELIEF REVISION: +REVISION > −REVISION
Angular/Lateral occipital cortex,
superior division (Pga L)
L 136 4.53 −51 −64 34
Angular Gyrus (PFm L) L – 4.26 −42 −58 31
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA6 L) L 95 4.43 −39 11 52
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA44 L) L – 3.65 −39 17 40
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA44 L) L – 4.03 −42 20 49
Significant cluster are reported at p < 0.05 FWE cluster level corrected.
Regions are reported from posterior to anterior. Regions, Anatomical labeling
corresponding to the cluster peak and sub-peak (according to Harvard-Oxford
cortical and subcortical structural atlases). Regions in brackets, Anatomical labeling
corresponding to the cluster peak and to sub-peaks are also reported according to Jülich
histological cyto-and myelo-architectonic atlas by Eickhoff et al. (2005, 2006, 2007); H,
Hemisphere of peak; k, cluster extent in voxel; Max Z, Maximum Z-value; sub-peaks of
the regions with cluster level below p < 0.05 FWE corrected are reported in italics.
The belief revision contrast (+REVISION > −REVISION)
activated two clusters FWE corrected at p < 0.05; one in the
left IPL (angular gyrus) and the other in the left middle frontal
gyrus. The inverse contrast (−REVISION > +REVISION) did
not show any significant activation. For each relevant contrast,
overlap with meta-analytic activations was tested in the following
way: Based on the peak-voxel coordinate activated in this
contrast, we checked for each meta-analysis map if significant
activation was found here. The left angular gyrus cluster peak and
sub-peaks of the belief revision contrast were also significantly
activated in our false belief and in our episodic memory
meta-analysis. This overlap suggests that by becoming aware
of having to revise one’s belief one attributes a false belief to
oneself 8.
8This is a novel finding with interesting implications. Attribution of false beliefs
to oneself could be a reason why invalid cue trials on the Posner task activate the
belief attribution region in the TPJ (Mitchell, 2008).
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FIGURE 3 | Identity contrast (red); belief revision contrast (blue), and overlap between the two contrasts (magenta). Activation cluster are superimposed
on an MNI template. All contrasts were shown at p < 0.05 FWE cluster level corrected threshold.
Identity and Belief Revision
As argued earlier in the explanation of our experimental design,
we needed to check if brain activity for identity statements can
also be found for other statements that cause belief revision. This
is necessary in order to not misinterpret activations as caused by
identity statements when in fact they may be due to the listener
attributing a false belief to herself. Figure 3 shows the activation
patterns for the identity contrast (+IDENT >−IDENT) and for
belief revision contrast (+REVISION > −REVISION). Overlap
was determined by inclusively masking the belief revision
contrast with the identity contrast (at the default threshold
of p < 0.001). We found overlap in the left angular gyrus
(−54, −52, 43) k = 15 and in the right lateral occipital cortex
(48, −64, 40) k = 5. Given this overlap, we cannot rule out
that our identity statements were activating these left IPL areas
because they caused a belief revision. Therefore, to detect areas
activated by the identity contrast independently of belief revision,
we removed (exclusively masked) all regions activated by belief
revision (p < 0.001 uncorrected) from the identity contrast.
The identity contrast outside the belief revision mask stayed
significant in the left IPL, (k = 74) at FWE cluster level corrected
p < 0.05 with the cluster peak (−60,−34, 37) and two sub-peaks
in the left supramarginal gyrus (−54,−43, 46;−54,−49, 43).
This result confirms our expectation based on developmental
data that identity statements activate the left left IPL, as the
region is sensitive to perspective differences. To answer our more
specific question, whether identity statements activate a more
specific “perspective region” in the left IPL, we need to define
a region of interest. Here we adopt the overarching view of
Cabeza et al. (2012) that allows for subdivisions within a broad
brain region. The broad region (in our case, the left IPL) has
a global function (representing perspective differences) and its
various sub-regions mediate different aspects (false beliefs, visual
perspectives, etc.) of the global function. The expected pattern
of finding is that each perspective task should activate the broad
region and partially overlap with activations by the other tasks.
For this purpose we used the results from our meta-analysis. We
checked for each peak voxel if a meta-analysis showed significant
activation at the given coordinate. Results of this examination are
TABLE 4 | Overlap (+) of identity activations in Study 2 and 3 with false
belief, episodic memory, and visual perspective taking.
Peak label Overlap with
MNI coordinates FB EM vPT
STUDY 2
Cluster peak: SMG 1 −60 −34 37 – – –
Sub-peak: AG 1′ −54 −52 43 + – –
Sub-peak: SMG 1
′′
−54 −43 46 – – –
STUDY 3
Cluster peak: SMG 2 −39 −46 43 – – +
Sub-peak: SMG 2′ −42 −49 46 – – +
Peak label. corresponds to the labeling in Figure 2. MNI peak coordinates of Study 2 and
Study 3 were converted into Talairach space to have the same stereotactic space as the
meta-analysis. FB, False belief reasoning; EM, Episodic memory; vPT, Visual perspective
taking.
given in Table 4. Figure 2 show the overlay of identity contrast
peaks with the activations shown in the meta-analyses.
We were unable to directly compare results because our
imaging studies and the meta-analyses were analyzed in different
coordinate systems. All meta-analyses had to be performed
in Talairach space, as the default coordinate system of Effect-
Size Signed Differential Mapping (ES-SDM) software, version
2.31 for meta-analysis (Radua et al., 2010, 2012); http://www.
sdmproject.com), while our data were normalized in MNI space.
We thus converted our left SMG cluster peak and sub-peaks into
Talairach space (seeTable 4). We constructed a 3mm in diameter
sphere—which corresponds to the voxel-size of our images –
around those peaks using the WFU PickAtlas (http://fmri.
wfubmc.edu/software/PickAtlas). One of the sub-peak spheres
in the angular gyrus that overlapped with belief revision
also overlapped significantly with false belief meta-analysis
areas [a coordinate-wise search for foci that were significantly
activated in both analyses, performed in MRIcron (http://www.
mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron/)]. This confirms our
prediction that the processing of identity statements might
have led participants to correct their rashly formed belief
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about the “tour guide” and the “driver” as being two distinct
people to believing that there is only one person filling both
positions.
Discussion
Our initially formulated expectations for the identity contrast
received a fairly clear answer. (1) We were able to identify at
least one region that is significantly (FWE-corrected) activated
by the identity contrast. (2) This identity cluster lies in the left
IPL as predicted in the hypothesis; tasks that require awareness
of perspective will activate this region. (3) Although the main
peak and one of the sub-peaks of the identity cluster were
in the left supramarginal gyrus another sub-peak was in the
angular gyrus that overlapped with false belief activation of the
meta-analysis.
This pattern of results fits the overarching view (Cabeza
et al., 2012) that the left IPL has the overarching function of
registering (actual or potential) perspective differences. Different
tasks modulate this function, showing activation in different
parts of the IPL but such that they partially overlap, as the
meta-analysis of perspective tasks (false belief, visual perspective
taking, and episodic memory) show. Our results extend this
picture to identity tasks.
Overlap of the identity contrast in our study happened to
occur in the meta-analytic areas for false belief activation. One
problem of interpretation occurred because our identity task
involved belief revision. Belief revision, as we were able to show,
also activates in the meta-analytic false belief area, suggesting
that belief revision, at least when one is aware of it, amounts
to attributing a past false belief to oneself. This raises the
possibility that the overlap between the identity contrast and false
belief may be due to the belief attribution caused by the belief
revision inherent in our identity condition. Therefore, it would be
reassuring if overlap with perspective tasks can be found without
the involvement of belief revision in identity tasks. This was
investigated in the next study.
Study 3: Identity 2
The objective of this experiment is to check whether the central
results of Study 2 can be replicated by avoiding the confounding
of identity statements with belief revision. The confound resulted
from our decision to prevent participants glossing a simple
identity statement like, “the mayor is the lawyer,” as an attributive
statement, “the mayor is a lawyer.” While the former mentions
two people (the mayor and the lawyer) and then says something
about their identity, the latter only mentions one person (the
mayor) and then informs about that person’s profession. To avoid
such a gloss we used a context sentence to establish the mayor
and the lawyer as two different individuals in participants’ minds.
With the identity statement participants then learned that mayor
and lawyer are the same person. This led inevitably to a belief
revision.
For this current experiment we decided to run the risk
of participants glossing some of the identity statements as
attributive assertions. If this results in similar activations as in
Study 2 (especially of the left IPL) we can conclude that these
activations are not due to belief revision. Trying to minimize
the risk of an attributive gloss, each statement used a common
description (the lawyer) as its first referential term and as the
second term a proper name (MrMüller). Although one can easily
gloss “Mr Müller is the lawyer” as “Mr Müller is a lawyer),” it is
harder to do so with “The lawyer is Mr Müller9.”
Method
Participants
Seventeen (5 males; mean age 24.6 years, SD = 4.9 years) right-
handed university students participated in this study for course
credits and small monetary reimbursement. All participants were
native German speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, and had no history of neurological disorder. A written
informed consent was obtained from all the participants before
scanning. The ethical committee of the University of Salzburg
approved the study.
Design and Stimuli
The study had five conditions (see Table 5) consisting of written
German sentences. Three context conditions were introduced
9Although not impossible; one could gloss it as “The lawyer is called Mr Müller.”
Also, the use of a proper name in the identity condition raises the potential danger
that the proper name is responsible for the left IPL and precuneus activation
and not the identity statement itself. Fortunately, existing data from clinical and
imaging studies speak against this possibility (for review see Semenza, 2011).
Processing of proper names compared to common names was linked to activation
in bilateral temporal poles, and, somewhat less consistently, to anterior parts of the
superior temporal sulcus, ventral mPFC, and the anterior cingulate. In contrast,
the left IPL and precuneus were not associated with processing of proper names.
TABLE 5 | Example sentences of Study 3 (translated from German; see Table S3 in supplementary material for more original examples in German).
Conditions Context sentence (S1) 4.5 s Condition sentence (S2) 3 s Comprehension questions? 5.5 s
Identity-with-context (IDENTc) The doctor saves the lawyer after the accident The lawyer is Mr. Moser Who is Mr. Moser?a
Predication-with-context (PREDc) The lawyer is young Who is young?
Context only (C) – Who saved the lawyer?
Identity only (IDENTo) – The neurologist is Dr. Phillips Who is the neurologist?
Baseline (BL) The chair is old-fashioned What is old-fashioned?
aThe comprehension question in conditions with context sentence varied accordingly (see design and stimuli section of Study 3 for details).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 360
Arora et al. Identity and awareness of perspective
with a context sentence mentioning two people, e.g., a doctor
and a lawyer. In the identity-with-context (IDENTc) condition
an identity statement followed which expressed that one of
these people (lawyer) was identical to, e.g., Mr. Müller. In the
predication-with-context (PREDc) condition the second sentence
predicated some attribute of, e.g., the lawyer. In the context-only
(C) condition this second sentence was omitted. This condition
served as a parameter of no interest for comparing IDENTc with
PREDc. Two additional conditions served to replicate a finding
of a pilot study using simple identity statements without any
background context (identity only, IDENTo). The pilot activation
was difficult to interpret, as the design didn’t have any explicit
low-level baseline. We therefore included, a low-level baseline
condition (BL) with simple sentences (e.g., the glasses are old-
fashioned).
Twenty-seven different sentences were used per condition,
resulting in a total of 135 trials in the experiment. All sentences
of IDENTc and PREDc conditions were formed by linking a
referential noun phrase, e.g., “The lawyer” by the particle “is” with
either a proper name to form an identity statement or with an
adjective to form predicative sentences. The noun phrases were
counterbalanced for the two conditions.
We controlled for sentence length in all conditions. The
mean number of letters in the context sentences (S1) varied
between conditions from 40.7 (±6.0) in IDENTc to 40.5 (±6.0)
in PREDc to 41.2 (±7.0) in C, and the average letter count
in the identity sentences (S2) varied from 22.19 (±2.6) in
IDENTo to 23.5 (±2.9) in IDENTc. There was no significant
difference across conditions for context or for identity sentences
(all p’s ≥ 0.35).
The presentation times for sentences S1 and S2 are shown
in Table 5. On 30% of trials a comprehension question was
asked. In the context conditions this question could be about
any of the three names mentioned (for example see Table 5:
“Who saved the lawyer?” or “Who did the doctor save?” or “Who
is Mr. Moser?”). This variation was to ensure that participants
had to integrate sentences S1 and S2 in a single model. In the
conditions without context the question only varied between
the two names that referred to the same individual (e.g., “Who
is Mr. Moser?” or “Who is the neurologist?”). The total time
provided was 5500ms: the question was presented for 3000ms,
followed by 1000ms of black screen, and finally the answer option
for 250ms (e.g., <the lawyer> <the doctor>). Correct and
incorrect options to the question were balanced across conditions
to avoid confounds of any strategies to answer the questions
and habitual finger use. Stimulus presentation, timings and
response recording were controlled by the Presentation Software
(Neurobehavioral System, Albany, CA, USA).
Functional neuroimaging was divided into three sessions.
Each session comprised 45 trials, 9 pre-condition trials and
14 comprehension questions. The order of the presentation of
sessions was counterbalanced across participants. A single trial
without question lasted for 11 s in the conditions with context,
6.5 s in the identity only and in the baseline condition, and
8 s in the context only trials. Each single session lasted for
10.35min, and the whole functional scanning of the experiment
took 31.07min.
Procedure
The participants were given a training session before the start
of the scanning. They were specifically instructed to read
and understand the sentences carefully, and that they would
sometimes be asked to answer a question to verify their attention
and comprehension of the vignettes. Behavioral responses were
collected using an MRI-compatible response box.
fMRI Data Acquisition
Functional and structural imaging was acquired with a Siemens 3
Tesla Tim-Trio Scanner, located at the Christian-Doppler-Clinic,
Salzburg. Functional images sensitive to the BOLD contrast were
obtained with a T2*-weighted gradient EPI sequence using a
32 channel head coil. Per subject, three sessions, a total of 260
EPI images including 6 dummy scans at the beginning of the
functional images were scanned to allow transient signals to
diminish (TR = 2250ms; TE = 30ms; matrix size = 64 × 64;
voxel size = 3.0 × 3.0 × 3.0mm3; slice thickness = 3.0mm;
slice gap 0.3mm; FOV = 192mm; flip angle = 70◦). Thirty-
six axial slices were acquired in descending order parallel to the
bicommissural (co-planar with AC–PC) line along the z-axis.
In addition for each subject sagittally oriented high-resolution
structural scan was acquired (T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence;
TR = 2300ms; TE = 2.91ms; voxel size 1.0 × 1.0 × 1.0mm3;
slice-thickness = 1.00mm; matrix 256 × 256; FOV = 256mm;
192 slices per volume; flip angle= 9◦).
fMRI Data Processing
Preprocessing and statistical data analysis was performed
using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM8, http://www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm), implemented in MATLAB 7.6.0.324 [R2008a]
(Matworks, Sherborn, MA) runtime environment. Images
were slice-time and motion corrected by standard SPM8
algorithms. Functional images were registered to the SPM8 EPI
template. The structural scan was co-registered onto the mean
functional images of each session and segmented. The structural
and functional images were normalized to MNI (Montreal
Neurological Institute, McGill, Montreal, Canada) template. The
normalized images were resampled to isotropic 3 × 3 × 3mm
voxels and smoothed with an 8mm full width at half maximum
(FWHM) Gaussian kernel.
The preprocessed data were analyzed using a GLM approach.
Per subject, and session, IDENTc, PREDc, IDENTo, and BL
condition sentence (S2) was modeled as a separate regressor
of interest with the duration of 3 s and convolved with the
hemodynamic response function. The S1 of conditions with
context (IDENTc and PREDc) and C were modeled with the
duration of 4.5 s as a single regressor of no interest. We also
modeled the comprehension question with the duration of 5.5 s
as a separate regressor of no interest. Additionally, realignment
parameters and sessionmeans were included in the designmatrix
as covariate. The low frequency noise was removed by high-pass
filter with a cut-off of 128 s, and serial correlation was taken into
account using an autocorrelation AR (1) model, as implemented
in SPM8. At the individual level of contrasts the four conditions
were modeled separately relative to an implicit baseline.
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TABLE 6 | Behavioral results of Study 3: mean accuracy in percent hit rate
(SD).
Conditions
IDENTc PREDc IDENTo BL C
Hit-Rate (%)SD 98.4(4.6) 97.4(5.9) 97.6(5.5) 100(0) 94.1(5.7)
Data at the second level were subject to a random effects
analysis to allow for population inference. We computed paired
t-tests between contrasts of interest. Whole brain results are
reported at a voxel-wise threshold of p < 0.001 together with
a FWE cluster level corrected threshold of p < 0.05.
Results and Discussion
Behavioral Results
Overall accuracy was very high 97.51% (see Table 6), with an
overall miss rate of 5.06%. The high accuracy was a good
indicator that participants were attentive and understood the
task. Given that accuracy was at ceiling in this study, it was
unnecessary to carry out statistical tests here.
We do not report reaction time (RT), since the RTs depended
on the time spent to answer the comprehension question they
do not reliably reflect the actual time taken to comprehend the
vignettes.
Neuro-imaging Results
The main contrast of interest is the one between identity-with-
context and predication-with-context (IDENTc > PREDc). The
whole brain analysis for this contrast showed two significant
FWE-corrected clusters (see Table 7). One cluster lies in the
precuneus on the left side, the other, in the left supramarginal
gyrus as predicted.
The inverse contrast (PREDc > IDENTc) showed activations
in quite distant parts of the brain (see Table 7 and Figure 4).
Two large FWE corrected clusters were located in the left
and right temporal pole area associated with social scripts
and social concepts (Zahn et al., 2007; Ross and Olson,
2010) and prevalent in theory of mind studies (Schurz et al.,
2014). This is plausibly due to the fact that predicative
information about a person (the lawyer is young) stimulates
social thoughts more strongly than a statement that this person
is identical to someone (Mr. Moser) about whom one has no
information.
The identity statement without context compared to the
baseline condition (IDENTo > BL) showed significant activation
of the left supplementarymotor area (SMA), left precentral gyrus,
left lateral occipital cortex, bilateral cerebellum, left inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG) and right superior parietal lobe activation at
FWE cluster level corrected at p < 0.0510.
10This finding poses two questions for us. The first one is problematic for our
account: Why does this contrast not activate in the left IPL? We can offer the
following two post-hoc explanations. Intuitively, in the no-context condition
(see Table 5) “The neurologist is Dr. Phillips,” can plausibly be glossed as “The
TABLE 7 | Supra-threshold whole brain activation of identity vs.
predication in context conditions of Study 3.
Region H k Max Z MNI coordinates
x y z
IDENTITY: IDENTc > PREDc
Precuneus Cortex (7M L) L 88 4.07 −12 −67 28
Lateral Occipital Cortex, superior L – 3.61 −15 −76 46
division (7P L)
Precuneus Cortex L – 3.58 −18 −70 22
Supramarginal Gyrus (hlP1) L 67 4.09 −39 −46 43
Supramarginal Gyrus (hlP1) L – 4.06 −42 −49 46
INVERSE IDENTITY: PREDc > IDENTc
Temporal Pole (No label) R 146 4.90 48 8 −26
Superior Temporal Gyrus (No label) R – 4.24 57 −10 −8
Superior Temporal Gyrus (No label) R – 4.58 54 2 −17
Temporal Pole (No label) L 191 5.69 −51 11 −20
Superior Temporal Gyrus (No label) L – 4.12 −51 −4 −17
Temporal Pole (No label) L – 5.19 −45 14 −26
Significant cluster are reported at p < 0.05 FWE cluster level corrected.
Regions are reported from posterior to anterior. Regions, Anatomical labeling
corresponding to the cluster peak and sub-peak (according to Harvard-Oxford
cortical and subcortical structural atlases). Regions in brackets, Anatomical labeling
corresponding to the cluster peak and sub-peak are also reported according to Jülich
histological cyto-and myelo-architectonic atlas by Eickhoff et al. (2005, 2006, 2007); H,
Hemisphere of peak; k, cluster extent in voxel; Max Z, Maximum Z-value; sub-peaks of
the regions with cluster level below p < 0.05 FWE corrected are reported in italics.
Relation to Study 2 and Meta-analysis
The predicted activation by the identity contrast (IDENTc >
PREDc) in Study 3 was in close vicinity to the activation observed
in the left IPL for the identity contrast (+IDENT > − IDENT)
in Study 2. After masking the belief revision clusters the average
Euclidian distance between the sub-peaks of Study 2 (−54,
−43, 46, and −54, −49, 43) and the cluster peak and sub-peak
(−39, −46, 43, and −42, −49, 46) of Study 3 was 14.16mm.
In order to assess the support for the claim that all perspective
tasks activate the overarching region in the left IPL we tested
neurologist is called Dr. Phillips,” hence no identity is expressed, and consequently
no left IPL activation. This gloss is intuitively less likely when a context is provided:
S1 “The doctor saves the lawyer after the accident,” followed by S2 “The lawyer is
Mr. Moser,” is less likely to be glossed in a similar way as indicated by the fact that
a glossed version of sentence 2 “The lawyer is called Mr. Moser,” would provide an
unexpected and less informative content than the un-glossed original version. Our
second explanation pertains to the fact that the comprehension questions in the
context conditions varied. They could be, e.g., “Who saved the lawyer?,” “Who did
the doctor save?,” or “Who is Mr. Moser?” which can only be answered if sentences
S1 and S2 have been integrated within a model. In contrast, sentences S2 without
context, e.g., “The neurologist is Dr. Phillip,” the questions were always about the
person mentioned in S2, “Who is the neurologist?” or “Who is Dr. Phillip?” This
question could be answered on the basis of the sentence’s surface form without
interpreting it within a mental model, i.e., without thinking of different individuals
and identity—hence no left IPL activation. The second question raised by this
finding is: Why does this contrast activate five areas which are not activated by
the sentences in the context conditions? This is an interesting question but not
directly problematic for our account. One feature that distinguishes IDENTo> BL
from IDENTc > PREDc contrast is that the former contrast is confounded with
a contrast of person vs. no person, which could account for at least some of these
activations.
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FIGURE 4 | Contrast of identity-with-context > predication-with-context (red) and the inverse contrast (blue). Activation cluster are superimposed on an
MNI template. All contrasts were shown at p < 0.05 FWE cluster level corrected threshold.
for overlap of the identity contrast (IDENTc > PREDc) with
areas shown in the meta-analyses. Using the same method as in
Study 2 we converted the left SMG cluster peak and sub-peaks of
Study 3 (see Table 4, Figure 2 for overlap details) into Talairach
space, and constructed a 3mm in diameter sphere around it,
which overlappedwith the regions of the visual perspective taking
meta-analysis and bordered on the areas activated by false belief
vignettes and episodic memory.
The fact that the activations found in the two identity studies
did not directly overlap is mitigated by the strong connectivity
between the subareas of the IPL in which the activations
occurred. The SMG cluster peak (−60, −34, 37) and the sub-
peaks (−54, −52, 43, and −54, −43, 46) of the identity contrast
in Study 2 (see Table 3) fall into the cytoarchitectonic area of the
left PF and PFm region (Caspers et al., 2006, Jülich Histological
Atlas). The SMG cluster peak (−39, −46, 43) and sub-peak
(−42, −49, 46) of Study 3 (see Table 7) are located in the left
intraparietal sulcus (subregion: hIP1; Choi et al., 2006; Jülich
Histological Atlas). According to Caspers et al. (2011) structural
connectivity fingerprints show a strong connection between PF,
PFm, and hIP1 region. The strong connectivity among the
different areas activated by our studies supports the conclusion
that different activation points reflect activity of an overarching
functionally related network.
General Discussion
Main Achievements
Our studies produced two main achievements. (a) We were able
to establish that the ability to track perspective, which marks an
important advance in child development around 4 years of age,
manifests itself in a common brain activity. Based on existing data
we hypothesized that such commonality might be reflected in
mutual activations of a particular brain region. The results show
that, indeed, all different kinds of perspective tasks that, to our
knowledge, have been used in brain imaging activate the left IPL
and precuneus; although the evidence for the latter remains less
solid.
(b) Our second achievement was to turn the “overarching
view” of a region’s broader function, which Cabeza et al. used
to summarize existing results, into a predictive instrument. We
proceeded in the following way. In a meta-analysis we established
that activations of three kinds of perspective tasks show triple
overlap in the left IPL and precuneus. This result establishes that
the left IPL and precuneus, qualify as areas with the overarching
function of tracking perspective. To test the general validity
that these regions are responsible for tracking perspective we
looked for further perspective tasks. We found several single
studies, too few for a meta-analysis. We then needed to check
whether the reported activations overlap with the meta-analytic
areas, ideally within the area of triple overlap. However, results
from single studies do not show the stability of meta-analyses
and total overlap with all three tasks from the meta-analysis
would be unreasonably conservative. So we settled for the
following criterion: The results satisfy the expectations from the
overarching view if the activations are found in the target areas
(the left IPL and precuneus) and overlap with at least one of the
meta-analytic activations in those areas.
With this procedure we were able to show that existing data
conform to the hypothesis that the left IPL and precuneus qualify
as areas with the overarching function of tracking perspective.
We then used the same technique for prediction of identity
statements, which qualify as perspective tasks on the basis of a
technical account, activate within the overarching regions of the
left IPL and precuneus. This prediction was confirmed and with
it the hypothesis that these areas track perspective.
The concept of an overarching function helps with the
problem of low power of individual studies. For instance, the
lack of overlap of activations in our two identity studies can be
explained by two factors accounted for in the overarching view.
Due to their low power, activations happen to be detected at
different points within the overarching region. Another reason
for the discrepancy is that the belief revision induced in our first
study drew the center of activationmore toward the region where
false beliefs are processed than in the second study where no
belief revision occurred.
Relation to Competing Theories
The main competitor for our claim that the left IPL has
the overarching function of tracking perspective is the BUA
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(bottom-up attention) model for the ventral part of the parietal
cortex (VPC = IPL) put forward by Cabeza et al. (2012). As an
extension of Corbetta and Shulman (2002) dual attention model
BUA sees the VPC (IPL) bilaterally responsible for detecting
salient and behaviorally relevant stimuli in the environment,
especially when they were previously unattended (exogenous,
or stimulus-driven attention). Cabeza et al. (2012) extended
this model from attention capture by environmental stimuli
to capture by internal (memory-based) information. Three
interesting aspects arise about the relationship between BUA and
perspective tracking: similarities, reducibility, and differences.
Similarities
Perspective tasks can be seen as a special kind of internal
attention capture. In our thinking and conversations we usually
stick to a single perspective because mixing different perspectives
is a source of confusion11 . Therefore, (external or internal
reasoning) cues that indicate the need for a change in perspective
are exogenous stimuli, and should activate the IPL according
to BUA. Attention capture by cues for potential perspective
differences is, however, special as it does not require reorienting
attention to information about a new topic but reorienting to
a new way of informing about (view, mode of presentation,
perspective of) the same topic. On these grounds we may
consider two possible views of how activation of the left IPL by
perspective tasks relates to BUA.
Differences
Perspective tracking differs strikingly from BUA in terms
of lateralization. Perspective tracking evidently has regional
specificity only for the left IPL, while BUA is claimed to operate
bilaterally. Cabeza et al. (2012) noticed a prevalence of the left
IPL (VPC) activation reports for some tasks in their review and
give two possible reasons for it. Left activation reports prevail
when predominantly verbal stimulus material is used. However,
this explanation does not quite fit the finding that false belief
vignettes, which are purely verbal, activate bilaterally (Schurz
et al., 2014) while visual perspective tasks, which use a much
stronger visual presentation mode, activate exclusively on the left
side (Schurz et al., 2013).
Cabeza et al. also suggested that authors often focus on one
hemisphere for historical reasons linked to work on patients
with lesions, e.g., neglect being observed with right hemisphere
parietal lesions. This explanation does not apply to the evidence
from perspective tasks we have reviewed, which stems exclusively
from fMRI studies without any historical bias. Although few
studies test for hemispheric asymmetry the sheer number of
studies that report activation only in left and not in the right IPL
is remarkable. Of the 14 visual perspective tasks included in the
meta-analysis by Schurz et al. (2013) all of them reported activity
in left, only Wraga et al. (2010) found bilateral IPL activation.
Similarly in ourmeta-analysis of 16 remember-know studies all of
them report left and only Eldridge et al. (2000) reported bilateral
IPL activation. This is clear evidence of stronger activation in
11A good example are conceptual pacts (Brennan and Clark, 1996) which help
ensure that a particular object of conversation is referred to under the same label,
since a change of label also entails a change of perspective (Clark, 1997).
the left, as only two out of thirty studies (combined vPT + EM)
showed bilateral activation and no other study showed activation
in the right hemisphere (binomial test z = −4.56, p < 10−6).
Moreover, the two false sign studies (Perner et al., 2006;
Aichhorn et al., 2009) only showed effects in the left IPL, and
our two studies with identity statements also showed significant
reliable activation in the left IPL12. The noticeable exception to
this left asymmetry are false belief vignettes, which activate the
TPJ (including the IPL) on the right asmuch as on the left (Schurz
et al., 2014; see our Figure 1). One reason for this may be that
the false belief task engages theory of mind, which activates areas
in temporal lobe immediately adjacent and overlapping with the
left and right IPL. In contrast, the other perspective tasks show
no activations in adjacent areas, only in rather distant areas.
All of them tend to activate the precuneus in an overlapping
fashion (see Figure 2). Episodic remembering activates bilateral
para-hippocampal gyrus areas [e.g., Daselaar et al., 2006; our
episodic memory meta-analysis (see Figure 1)], whereas visual
perspective tasks activate, the precuneus, left IPL, precentral, and
middle frontal region.
Reducing Perspective Tracking to BUA
As outlined above perspective tasks can be seen as a special case
of exogenous attention capture, because endogenous thinking
usually maintains to the same perspective. One obvious exception
to this occurs when perspective itself becomes the topic of
thinking. For instance, in visual perspective tasks the instructions
are to judge how another viewer sees the display. So taking
the other person’s perspective is endogenous to the set task
and should, according to BUA, activate dorsal parts of the
parietal cortex and not the IPL. Another problem case for BUA
is a fact persistently ignored in the discussion of why theory
of mind tasks activate the TPJ (or IPL) as a consequence of
attention reorienting in false belief tasks (Decety and Lamm,
2007; Corbetta et al., 2008; Mitchell, 2008; Cabeza et al., 2012). It
is never made clear why the act of reorienting plausibly required
in the false belief vignettes (shifting attention from where an
object actually is to where an agent mistakenly thinks it is) is
not also required in the photo control vignettes (shifting from
where the object actually is to where it is in a photo), a contrast
introduced by Saxe and Kanwisher (2003) and since used inmany
studies with exceedingly strong meta-analytic effects (Schurz
et al., 2014).
These two problem cases for BUA can be explained by
perspective tracking. Visual perspective tasks require perspective
tracking hence activate the left IPL. False belief tasks do so too
and reliably activate the left IPL, while the photo control tasks do
not. A photo taken of the ice cream van in an earlier location does
not give a different perspective on where the van is now (unlike a
false belief or a flipped direction sign which does give a different
view of where the van is now). In sum, although perspective
tracking shows a close affinity to bottom-up attention processes it
is unlikely that the activation in the left IPL perspective tasks can
be completely explained by BUA.
12However right IPL activation for the identity only condition suggests that the
lateralization is one of degree and not one without any involvement of the right
hemisphere.
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Reducing Left Lateralized BUA to Perspective
Tracking
A different view on perspective tracking and BUA is to claim
that only perspective tracking is the overarching function of (at
least) the left IPL. To defend this view one would need to show
that the evidence recited by Cabeza et al. (2012) in favor of
BUA can also be used as evidence for perspective tracking, i.e.,
that all the tasks that activate the left IPL can be argued to be
perspective tasks. Up to now we have considered only tasks that
had been independently claimed to be perspective tasks in the
developmental literature. Hence, whether a task should or should
not activate the left IPL was a predictive enterprise from an
existing classification. To retrospectively decide whether a task,
which activates the IPL, is a perspective task or not is a much
more unconstrained enterprise. We will therefore restrain our
analysis to some exemplary illustrations taken from the categories
discussed by Cabeza et al.
Number Processing
Equations can be viewed as identity statements (numerical facts:
4+5 is identical to 9) or computational procedures (if you have
4 and add 5 you get 9). So retrieval of numerical facts should
activate the left IPL since an identity is likely involved which
induces perspective tracking. And, indeed, the IPL is being
activated (Dehaene et al., 2003). In contrast, calculation of the
result should not activate the IPL or, at least, less so. This also
turns out to be the case (Grabner et al., 2009). So, some findings
in this area clearly relate to perspective tracking.
Episodic Retrieval
In contrast to three contenders discussed by Cabeza et al. BUA
can explain a characteristic U-function of recognition certainty.
The IPL activation is stronger for items judged “definitely old”
or “definitely new” than for uncertain answers (data only for
the left IPL; Yonelinas et al., 2005; Daselaar et al., 2006). This
activation pattern can also result from perspective tracking.
Correct recognition can come about for two reasons at least
(Jacoby, 1991). One can make a conscious judgment of whether
the presented test item has been on the learning list. In some of
these cases onemay use an episodic approach (Tulving, 1989) and
try to re-experience ones’ earlier experience of having seen this
item during learning. Re-experience requires awareness that one’s
re-experience of seeing the item is a representation, which gives
a perspective, of the past event (Perner et al., 2007). Plausibly if
this approach gives a clear answer it will provide high confidence
that the item has or has not been experienced. Since awareness
of perspective is involved, the confident judgments will activate
the left IPL. In other cases no clear judgment may be possible
but one can still rely on a feeling of familiarity. Depending on
the strength of this feeling one will respond with “old” or “new,”
but the subjective confidence will be low. Familiarity judgments
do not need awareness of perspective; hence the resultant low
confidence answers will not be associated with activations of the
left IPL.
Conclusion
Tracking and monitoring perspectives is a skill whose acquisition
has important consequences on children’s reasoning and social
competence around the age of 4 years. In a meta-analysis of
brain imaging in adults we were able to show that this important
developmental factor is also reflected in a common cerebral
resource: the left IPL and precuneus track perspective. In two
empirical studies we were able to extend this finding and confirm
that these brain regions are reliably involved in other and novel
kinds of perspective tasks, e.g., processing identity statements.
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